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Necessarily Coextensive Predicates and Reduction 
In his influential book From Metaphysics to Ethics Frank Jackson offered a sophisticated 
argument for a reductive account of moral properties. The argument has two steps. The first 
step aims to tell us something about the general nature of moral properties. The conclusion is 
that moral properties are descriptive properties. The second step aims to offer a method by 
which we could determine the particular descriptive nature nature of moral properties – that 
is, to tell us which descriptive property each moral property is. The aim was to defend a form 
of naturistic moral realism.  
Recently Bart Streumer uses a more wide-ranging version of the first step of 
Jackson’s argument (although he rejects the second step). He expands this argument to cover 
not just moral properties, such as rightness and goodness, but all normative properties. So 
Streumer takes the first step of Jackson’s argument to show that all normative properties are 
descriptive properties. More precisely, his conclusion is that if there are normative properties 
they are identical to descriptive properties (2017, 11)1. Streumer then goes on to argue that if 
there are normative properties they are not identical with descriptive properties (42-61). He 
thus proposes a classic Kantian Antinomy. Kant lists four antinomies, each of which consists 
of a thesis and an antithesis. Both the thesis and the antithesis has what Kant regards as a 
compelling argument in its favour. He calls the first two antinomies mathematical and the 
third and fourth dynamical antinomies. He claims that the thesis and the antithesis of the 
mathematical antinomies are both false, and that the thesis and antithesis of the dynamical 
antinomies are both true. He does this using his distinction between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal. Like Kant’s dynamical antinomies, Streumer claims that the thesis and the 
antithesis of his antinomy are both true. But without Kant’s transcendental idealism that 
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise stated all references to Streumer will be to his 2017 book. 
commits him to saying that normative properties are impossible. They are impossible because 
if there were such properties they would be both descriptive and not descriptive (104).  
The end result is an error theory about all simple, positive normative judgements.2 We 
have no reason to do anything, to want anything, or to believe anything, including believing 
this version of error theory. That makes this error theory literally unbelievable3, although 
paradoxically Streumer regards this as a virtue of the theory (170ff). In this paper I will focus 
only on his arguments for the reduction of the normative to the descriptive, for if these 
arguments work that would be bad news for non-naturalist moral realists like me, 
independently of whether Streumer can ultimately argue for a general error theory about all 
normativity.  Also, given that the second step of his argument is that moral properties are not 
descriptive properties, if the first step fails, he will be left with an argument for non-naturalist 
realism. That is fine by me. 
For the sake of simplicity I will focus on the normative property of rightness in my 
discussion, and will understand rightness as peremptory rather than merely permissive, i.e., as 
requiring us to do some act rather than as merely permitting us to do it. It should however be 
noted that if the reductive argument works against rightness, it will work against all 
normative properties.  
Streumer has three reduction arguments. The first is an expanded version of Jackson’s 
argument. This is premised on the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive and the 
principle that necessarily coextensive predicates ascribe the same property – a principle he 
labels (N).  His second argument uses (N) but does not rely on supervenience. It relies simply 
                                                          
2 Not all normative judgements come out false according to error theory. Conditional normative judgements 
come out true, eg., the transitivity of ‘better than’. 
3 This is because, Streumer argues, we cannot believe that P whilst believing that we have no reason to believe 
that P. 
“A person beieves that p only if this person does not believe that there is no reason to believe that p, 
unless the belief that p is compulsive or deluded” (140)  
on the view that the nature of normative properties cannot depend on which normative theory 
is correct. The third argument is similar to the first, but with a more restricted supervenience 
base (34ff). I will not consider the third reduction argument separately, as its form makes it 
susceptible to the same objections as the first reduction argument. So to give it separate 
treatment would be unnecessarily repetitive. I will argue that these reduction arguments fail 
in a number of ways, and that this failure leaves us with an argument for non-reductive 
realism rather than an unbelievable error theory. 
Streumer’s 1st reduction argument 
Streumer does not offer a definition of what a normative or descriptive property is, 
but instead proposes the following necessary and sufficient conditions for each:  
NP - a property is normative iff it can be ascribed by a normative predicate. 
DP – a property is descriptive iff it can be ascribed by a descriptive predicate (3).  
He argues that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties roughly as follows: 
Take a particular right act – R1. The rightness of R1 must supervene on some cluster of 
descriptive properties which are such that if some act has those descriptive properties, it will 
be right.  Following Jackson, Streumer understands the supervenience base in the widest 
possible sense to include a complete description of the world in which each act is. So the 
description will include not only features that are non-controversially of the act itself, such as 
its being the helping of someone in need, but also its being such that every object in that 
possible world has such and such descriptive properties. We can capture this enormous 
description with a long conjunctive, descriptive predicate, ie, is d1, and is d2, and is d3… 
Call this predicate D1. Since a conjunction of descriptive predicates is a descriptive predicate, 
D1 is a descriptive predicate. Since D1 is a complete description of the world in which this 
right act is, the descriptive predicate D1 will entail the moral predicate ‘is right’. This follows 
from the global supervenience thesis that if two worlds have exactly the same descriptive 
nature they will have exactly the same ethical nature. But since different right acts have 
different supervenience bases, it will not follow that the predicate ‘is right’ entails the 
predicate D1.  
The argument for the right to left entailment proceeds by repeating the first procedure 
for each and every right act in logical space. That will get a descriptive predicate D2, D3, 
D4… each of which describes the complete supervenience base for the right acts R2, R3, 
R4… respectively. We can then form a new predicate which is the disjunction of D1, D2, D3, 
D4… Streumer calls this predicate D* (10). Since a disjunction of descriptive predicates is 
itself a descriptive predicate, D* is a descriptive predicate. Because the supervenience base of 
every possible right act in logical space figures as a disjunct of D*, it follows that if an act is 
right then it is D*. Since each disjunct of D* is sufficient to make an act right it will also 
follow that the predicate D* entails the predicate ‘is right’. We now have a possibly infinite 
descriptive predicate that is necessarily coextensive with the normative predicate ‘is right’.  
As noted earlier, Streumer endorses Jackson’s claim that necessarily coextensive 
predicates ascribe the same property (N) (11). Given (N), it follows that the property ascribed 
by the normative predicate ‘is right’ is the same property as the property ascribed by the 
predicate D*. This line of argument can be repeated for every normative predicate. So, 
Streumer concludes, normative properties are all identical to descriptive properties (11). That 
constitutes the first argument for reduction.  
 There are a number of points with which we may take issue with this line of 
argument. Take the notion of ascribing a property. How is the idea of property ascription to 
be understood? The property ascription claim is not a semantic claim. ‘Swans are white’ does 
not mean ‘Swans have the property of being white’4. If that were true, then realism about 
colours would be analytically true, assuming at least some simple positive colour statements 
are true. If true, however, such realism is not analytically true. The same point can be made 
about moral realism. If ‘abortion is wrong’ meant that ‘acts of abortion have the property of 
being wrong’ moral realism would be analytically true (granted some of these claims are 
true). I think moral realism is true, but this is a substantive metaphysical thesis, rather than an 
analytical truth.5  
I think the idea of property ascription is better understood as a metaphysical claim 
about truth-makers. If that is right, then the idea is that what makes a proposition of the form 
‘x is D’ true, where D is some descriptive predicate, is that x has, or instantiates, a descriptive 
property – that is, there is some descriptive way x is.  Streumer does not tell us what that 
descriptive way is. We are just told that it is the way that makes a proposition of the form ‘x 
is D’ true. The notion of a descriptive predicate is left undefined. I think that is okay as we 
have a decent intuitive grasp of the descriptive. Streumer goes on to say that ’the term 
“descriptive” is just a label. We could instead, he says, use the term ‘non-normative’ (3). That 
is okay so long as ‘non-normative’ is not understood as ‘not normative’ (3-4). But it is worth 
noting that he thinks of predicates as labels, as we will come back to that later.  
 Streumer rejects a kind of minimalism about properties according to which properties 
are simply the mirror of predicates,6 such that every predicate corresponds to a distinct 
property. That is shown by his endorsement of N. He also rejects the idea that properties 
simply mirror concepts. The concepts of water and of H2O are different, but the property of 
                                                          
4 Jackson looks like he thinks that this is a semantic claim when he says that “…to believe that X is right is to 
believe that X has the property of being right,… (2017, 196). 
5 It is standard to claim that realism is built into the practice of moral discourse. I take that to be weaker than 
claiming that it is analytical. 
6 In correspondence he said that he rejects this for dialectical reasons, and that he does not deny that there 
are also properties in the minimal sense.  
being water and the property of being H2O are the same (11). So there are fewer properties 
than there are concepts. What are properties if they are not simply the mirror in the world of 
predicates or concepts? Streumer takes them to be ‘ways objects can be’ (13). But it is not 
clear that ways things can be are in the actual world. What is in the actual world is ways 
things are. We can capture that by adding that instances of properties are ‘ways objects are’, 
and instances are uncontroversially in the world (although if properties are tropes then there 
will be no distinction here, and properties will be ways things are, rather than ways they can 
be). This is because a way something is cannot be separated from the thing that is in that way, 
so if the thing is in the world, so are all of the ways it is.  
Streumer claims that if properties are ways objects can be (and by extension, instances 
are ways things are), then (N) is the correct criterion of property identity (11). It is worth 
noting that Jackson was not quite so confident. When he proposed (N) he denied that 
necessary coextension entailed identity. He wrote: 
“I think the necessary co-extension of ethical and natural properties provides a strong 
reason to identify them, strong but not apodictic.” (2017, 201)  
 
I think that if Jackson thought that this principle led to the sort of paradoxical error theory 
Streumer proposes, he would regard this strong reason as overridden. Streumer would claim 
that that is just because the error theory is literally unbelievable7, so any alternative is more 
plausible (ch.11). But this point does not depend on the implausibility of a general error 
theory. All it requires is some moral proposition that we may, without arrogance, claim to 
know. Take some simple uncontroversial moral proposition, e.g., rape is wrong. If we know 
                                                          
7 This is because we cannot believe something we think we have no reason to believe. My own view is that his 
error theory is believable, so if unbelievability is a benefit of such a theory, it is not benefit he can enjoy . But I 
will not argue for that position here. 
anything in morality we know this. Grant Streumer the truth of all the premises of his 
argument except (N), and grant that his argument is valid, or at least provides a compelling 
case for a general normative error theory if (N) is true. We then have a choice between 1 and 
2.  
1) Accept that (N) is true, and reject our belief that rape is wrong. 
2) Retain our belief that rape is wrong, and reject (N).  
Even if we agree with Jackson that we have very good reason to accept (N), the sensible thing 
to do here would, I propose, be to reject (N).8 But let us put that point aside. Even if (N) is 
granted, and even if it is granted that we can invent a descriptive predicate that is necessarily 
coextensive with rightness, it would not follow that rightness is a descriptive property.  
According to Streumer and Jackson (N) is supposed to enables us to learn something 
about how the world is. It supposedly enables us to know that moral properties are descriptive 
properties. It only tells us something about the general nature of the moral, as it does not tell 
us what specific descriptive property any moral property is. But learning something about the 
general nature of some property, i.e., what class of property it is, is still learning something 
about its nature. But, learning that two predicates are necessarily co-extensive does not tell us 
anything about the single property they ascribe. Remember, according to Streumer predicates 
are simply labels or names for certain properties (3). But if that is right, then all we learn 
from the fact that the predicates ‘is right’ and D* are necessarily coextensive is that they both 
refer to the same property. Learning this does not tell us anything about the general nature of 
that property. That these two names are names for the same thing only tells us something 
about the English language. It does not tell us anything about the thing referred to other than 
                                                          
8 This is in part because N is a controversial theory about property identities, which seems vulnerable to 
counter-examples (see Shafer Landau, 2003, 91, Enoch, 2011, 138-139, and Bader, 2017) whereas ‘rape is 
wrong’ is in no way controversial, or vulnerable to counter-examples. There may be cases where it is unclear 
whether consent was given, either because of the age of the woman, or because she was drunk. But what is 
controversial here is just whether some specific case is one of rape, not about the general proposition that 
rape is wrong. 
that there is one thing rather than two. It is like learning that the label ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ refer to the same thing. We learn something about the world when we learn this 
– namely that there is one planet rather than two. But we do not learn anything about the 
general nature of that planet. The same is true of the labels ‘is right’ and D*. We may learn 
that there is one property rather than two if we grant (N), but in learning that, we do not learn 
anything about the general nature of that property.  
It may seem that the case of water and H2O provides a counterexample to my claim 
that learning that two terms are necessarily coextensive tells us something about the nature of 
the thing to which they refer. For when we learnt that the predicate ‘is water’ and ‘is H2O’ 
are necessarily coextensive, we did learn something about the nature of water – namely that it 
is essentially composed of two gasses in a certain ratio. But the order of knowledge is quite 
different in this case than it is in the reduction argument. We did not learn that water is H2O 
by first establishing that the predicates ‘is water’ and ‘is H2O’ are necessarily coextensive. 
Rather we learnt that these two predicates are necessarily coextensive by investigation the 
substance picked out by the predicate ‘is water’ and learning something about the essential 
nature of that substance. What we learnt by investigating this substance is that there is some 
way in which all water is similar, namely by the combination of these two gasses in the right 
ratio.  
The reduction argument works, or is supposed to work, in a quite different way. It 
does not work to necessary coextension, but from it. It is supposed to tell us something about 
the general nature of normative properties by constructing some predicate that is necessarily 
coextensive with normative predicates. It is this methodology of which I am sceptical, for the 
reasons mentioned above. If I am right then Streumer and Jackson make an illegitimate leap 
from the fact that these two predicates refer to the same property, to the conclusion that this 
property is descriptive. Of course given DP this conclusion comes out as true by definition. 
But for reasons I will now outline we should reject DP.  
To learn something about the nature of the single property ascribed by the predicates 
‘is right’ and D* we would have to consider the nature of various instances of that property, 
with a view to seeing in what way they are all similar. If there is a descriptive way in which 
they are all similar, however descriptiveness is to be understood, then we could conclude that 
the single property ascribed by the necessarily co-extensive predicates is a descriptive 
property. But if there is no descriptive way in which all instances of the relevant normative 
property are similar, then that property could not be a descriptive property.  If that property 
could not be a descriptive property, that would falsify DP, i.e., the claim that a property is 
descriptive iff it can be ascribed with a descriptive predicate.  
Take rightness. If there is no descriptive way in which all possible right acts are 
similar, then rightness cannot be a descriptive property.9 That is compatible with N, for it is 
compatible with the idea that the predicates ‘is right’ and ‘is D*’ ascribe the same property. If 
there is no descriptive way in which all right acts are similar then the property ascribed by ‘is 
right’ and D* could not be a descriptive property, and so DP would turn out false. That is 
compatible with the view that these predicates ascribe the same property, and so does not 
entail that N is false. But one cannot leap straight from the view that there is a single 
property, rather than two, to any conclusion about the general nature of that property without 
first ensuring that there is a descriptive way in which all right acts are similar. 
                                                          
9 For similar argument for why ethical properties cannot be descriptive properties see Majors, 2005). He rests 
his argument on the following principle: 
Kind Constraint - Property Formulation: if a property is of a kind K, then the members of its extension must have something in 
common which is visible from level K (2005, 485) 
Bradford, however, supposes that the supposed descriptive property referred to by D* is disjunctive (486). First, I don’t think that si true, 
and second, His way of putting the point still links to the sort of predicates that can be used to pick out this property rather than n the 
basis of something in the nature of the property itself. He also goes on to criticise N. But as I note, one can grant N, as the best it can do is 
show that some ethical predicate and D* refer to a single property. It does not follow from this that the single property is descriptive. 
 
Why is it so tempting to think that if there is a single property ascribed by the 
normative predicate ‘is right’ and the descriptive predicate D*, then that property must be 
descriptive. One reason why it seems so natural to move from (N), and the necessary co-
extensiveness of ‘is right’ and D*, to the claim that these predicates ascribe a descriptive 
property may be because normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, and so the 
descriptive property is explanatorily more fundamental. If, therefore, there is a single 
property here, it seems it must be the more fundamental descriptive one.  
But supervenience is an asymmetric relation. The ethical supervenes on the 
descriptive, not vice versa. If this relation becomes one of identity, i.e., rightness is identical 
with the descriptive property, that asymmetry is lost, as identity is symmetrical. So if the 
property of being right is identical with some descriptive property, no side would have 
explanatory priority over the other.10 Actually if the identity claim is true then neither 
property can supervene on the other, or result from, or ground the other, as there would not be 
two properties – the supervening one and the one supervened upon – but one property11. 
Neither could one sentence have priority over the other, although we may think that one does 
if we think that they are ascribing different properties. If the disjunctive descriptive predicate 
and the normative predicate are just a different names for the same property, then the 
sentence ‘act x is right’ is true because it is true that ‘act x is either D1 or D2 or D3,..’ would 
be like saying ‘planet y is Hesperus’ is true because it is true that ‘planet Y is Phosphorus’, or 
                                                          
10 Schroeder makes this point about property identity claims in his 2007 (pp.63-4). He prefers to talk of 
constitutive explanations rather than property identity, as the notion of explanation is asymmetric, so captures 
better the idea, say, that figures are triangles by having three sides and do not have three sides because they 
are triangles (2007, p63). But this is not how Streumer thinks of his reductive claim. I think however that 
Schroeder goes too far when he say that this sort of reductive thesis tells “us more about English than about, 
for example, reasons” (64). If the reduction is successful this would tell us that we need only postulate one 
truth-maker for two different types of sentence. That would be a metaphysical claim. (See also Bader, 2017, 
122) 
11 Bader (2017) argues that a distinctive type of grounding, normative grounding, is incompatible with identity. 
If this were true, and if similar grounding is required in addition to necessary coextensiveness for identity, then 
Jackson’s argument would fail. But it seems to me that Jackson could simply deny that there are different sorts 
of grounding, rather than different types of things grounded to deal with this objection.   
that it is true that ‘person Z is Superman’ because it is true that ‘person Z is Clarke Kent’. If 
the reductive claim were true these predicates would be merely different names for the same 
thing and neither would have priority over the other. So one cannot support the conclusion 
that the single property ascribed is a descriptive property from the explanatory priority of the 
descriptive. Once we have identity we lose all asymmetries including that of explanatory 
priority. 
Furthermore there are possible instances where a descriptive and a normative 
predicate are necessarily coextensive, but the single property ascribed would have to be the 
normative property. Sidgwick rejected a simple sensation account of pleasure on the ground 
that there is no way in which the very different pleasant experiences we enjoy, such as 
gustatory, aesthetic, philosophical, or social pleasure, are similar at the level of sensation. He 
writes: 
[W]hen I reflect on the notion of pleasure,—using the term in the comprehensive 
sense which I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle intellectual and 
emotional gratifications, no less than the coarser and more definite sensual 
enjoyments,—the only common quality that I can find in the feelings so designated 
seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term 
“desirable,” in the sense previously explained. I propose therefore to define 
Pleasure—when we are considering its “strict value” for purposes of quantitative 
comparison—as a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least 
implicitly apprehended as desirable.... (Methods 127) 
Suppose something like Sidgwick’s view is correct and pleasure =df desirable feeling. It 
would follow that the descriptive predicate ‘is pleasant’ is necessarily coextensive with the 
evaluative/normative predicate ‘is a desirable feeling’, and so this evaluative predicate would 
ascribe the same property as this descriptive predicate. But if the only way in which all 
pleasant feelings are similar is by being desirable, the single property ascribed by the 
evaluative and the descriptive predicate would be an evaluative property, falsifying DP.  
This example is further evidence that that it is a mistake to assume that if a descriptive 
and a normative predicate are necessarily coextensive, they ascribe a descriptive property, 
even if (N) is true. Even if we accept (N), we can only move from the co-extensiveness of a 
descriptive and a normative predicate to the view that the property ascribed by these 
predicates is a descriptive property if there is some descriptive way in which each instance of 
this property is similar. The Sidgwick example shows, I think, that this may not always be 
true. In such cases the property ascribed may well be a normative property, and since there is 
no descriptive way in which all pleasures are similar, this will be an irreducibly normative 
property. Since a necessarily coextensive ethical and descriptive predicate may ascribe a 
single ethical property, this could be true of ‘is right’ and D*. It could well be that the case 
that the only way in which all right acts are similar is by being right, and so the single 
property ascribed by the predicates ‘is right’ and D* must be the non-descriptive property of 
rightness itself.  
 I say it could well be the case that the only way in which all right acts are similar is by 
being right. That is because, as Streumer notes in his second argument for reduction, if some 
simple first order normative theory were correct, such as a simple form of utilitarianism, then 
there would be a descriptive predicate that is necessarily coextensive with ‘is right’, namely, 
the predicate ‘maximises happiness’ (30). We can add that if that is true then there would be a 
descriptive way in which all right acts are similar, and so rightness could be identified with 
that descriptive property. If we thought that right acts are right because they maximise 
happiness, that would be lost with this supposed identity, as right-making is an explanatory, 
and so asymmetric relation, and asymmetry would be lost with identity. So such a theorist 
would have to find some other right-making property. That would not be a problem for such a 
simple form of utilitarianism, for if maximising happiness and rightness were identical then 
the utilitarian could just sum all the things that would make these people happy as the right-
maker. But the main point is that simple utilitarianism would have a contender property with 
which to identify rightness. This would not, however, be an option if a pluralist normative 
theory, such as Rossian pluralism, were true, for then different right acts would be made right 
by different properties, and there would be no guarantee that there is some descriptive way in 
which all right acts are similar, and so no guarantee that there is some shared descriptive 
property with which rightness could be identified. 
 The above point would make the prospects for reduction depend to some degree on 
whether a simple first order normative theory is true. Streumer rejects that dependence, and I 
will discuss his view about that below. But even if that dependence is allowed, one would 
only be able to find descriptive similarity by defending a very crude first order ethical theory, 
and the prospects for that are not in my view good. In any case, neither Jackson nor Streumer 
provide such a defence. Jackson suggests that the descriptive property which is rightness may 
be the property of maximising happiness,12 but given his methodology there is no guarantee 
about that, and there are plenty of very good and familiar reasons to suppose that such a 
simple theory is false.13 
Could the descriptive way in which all right acts are similar be by having in common 
the disjunctive property that mirrors the predicate D*14? Jackson is willing to fall back on this 
                                                          
12 142 
13 See, for example, Ross (2002), Williams (1985), Scheffler (1982), and Scanlon (1998), although there are 
many others. 
14 The idea of a disjunctive property is tricky, as disjunction is a truth-function and properties disjoined are 
not truth-valued. Audi suggests a way round this problem. He writes:  
So the notion of a disjunctive property appears to depend on a different sort of disjunction, a manner of 
combining properties. The notion is not unintuitive, especially if it is understood by analogy with 
conjunction. The idea that properties can be combined by conjunction, though not uncontroversial, is at 
least straightforward. One way to get a handle on what disjunctive properties are supposed to be, then, 
position, if the method he outlines based on Ramsifying mature folk psychology doesn’t 
come up with something simpler. It should be noted that Streumer’s argument does not rely 
on disjunctive properties, since the job of the first step of the argument is to establish that 
normative properties are descriptive properties, not to tell us what descriptive property they 
are. But since the second step of his argument tries to show the failure of various attempts to 
specify what that descriptive property is, it is worth considering, albeit rather briefly, whether 
the descriptive property ascribed by the disjunctive predicate simply mirrors that predicate. 
We’d then have at least one descriptive way all right acts are similar, and so it could be true 
that rightness is a descriptive property. 
I do not, however, think that a disjunctive ‘property’ would be able to do what is 
required, for a disjunctive property could not capture a respect in which things that have that 
property are similar15. So disjunctive properties could not be genuine properties. To see this, 
take the simple disjunctive predicate ‘is either green or square’. Take two objects to which 
this predicate may truly be applied – a red square and a green circle. We can truly say that 
each object is either green or square, since only one disjunct of a disjunction needs to be true 
for the disjunctive claim to be true. How do we decide whether these two things are similar in 
the respect of being either green or square? That will depend on how we understand ‘being 
similar in a respect’. As Paul Audi has pointed out on one account of this idea such similarity 
follows trivially. Consider the following definition: 
For any things x and y, and any property F: x and y are similar in respect of being F = 
df x is F and y is F.  
                                                          
is to say that they are the complex properties that result from combining simpler properties in this 
disjunctive manner. (751) 
15 This point and the argument in its favour is familial in the literature. See for instance Armstrong (1978, 20),  
Heil 2005, p. 347, and Audi, 2013). 
All there is to similarity-in-a-respect, on this understanding, is property-sharing, so one could 
only deny that our two objects are similar in a disjunctive respect by denying that they share 
the same disjunctive property, which is clearly question-begging (Audi, 750). Audi offers a 
better alternative: 
For x to be similar to y in respect of being F will be for x insofar as x is F to resemble 
y insofar as y is F. (758) 16 
Disjunctive ‘properties’ do not satisfy this criterion. A green circle, in so far as it is green or 
square is simply green with no trace of squareness, and a red square, in so far as it is green or 
square, is simply square with no trace of greenness, and greenness does not in any way 
resemble squareness.17 If this simple disjunctive ‘property’ cannot capture any similarity 
between the things that are supposed to have it, then there is no hope for a property that 
combines (in the disjunctive way) many more properties.  
 Not all disjuncts of putative disjunctive properties are dissimilar. One could capture 
all determinate shades of red with a long disjunctive predicate = ‘is either scarlet, or imperial 
red, or Indian red,…’ One could not deny this disjunctive property on the ground that there is 
no way in which all things that have it are similar, for they are all similar in respect of being 
red. But this is a problem for the view that there are disjunctive properties rather than an 
advantage. For the way in which all of the disjuncts are similar is not disjunctive. They are all 
                                                          
16 Audi claims that this presupposes what he calls inheritance realism according to which properties are 
immanent to their bearers. This is an Aristotelian realist view rather than a Platonic one. But I do not see why 
one must assume inherence realism to use this definition. Audi writes: 
“The inherence realist insists that the distinction we make in thought between, say, a insofar as it is F 
and a insofar as it is G corresponds to a distinction in the thing itself.23 The inherence realist differs, 
then, from both the nominalist and the Platonist. The nominalist insists that the distinction between a 
insofar as it is F and a insofar as it is G is merely a distinction of reason. The Platonist allows that there 
is a real distinction here, but denies that it corresponds to any divisions within a itself between non-
mereological constituents of a” (753-4). 
But if the Platonist understands instances as actual ways things are (and universals as possible ways things 
might be) then the distinction between a insofar as it instantiates F and a in so far as it instantiates G will 
correspond to a real difference in a itself, for the instance of F and of G will be different ways in which a is. I 
will however put aside this point in what follows as it will overcomplicate things. 
17 Audi, 760. 
similar in respect of being red, and that is not disjunctive. Similarly, every triangular thing is 
either equilateral, or isosceles, or scalene, but that does not mean that triangularity is a 
disjunctive property. That is because there is a non-disjunctive thread of similarity running 
through all triangles in so far as they are triangular. 
 Another reason to reject the idea that there are genuine disjunctive properties is 
simply that they are redundant. All that is needed to make a disjunctive statement true is one 
of the properties ascribed by one of its disjuncts. So if a property ascription is understood 
metaphysically, we need not assume that disjunctive predicates ascribe disjunctive properties. 
Take the predicate ‘is either green or square’. What makes it true that a green circle is either 
green or square is its greenness (a non-disjunctive property), and what makes it true that a red 
square is either green or square is its squareness – once again, a non-disjunctive property. We 
do not need to suppose that, in addition to these non-disjunctive properties, these objects also 
have a disjunctive property of being either green or square in order to make the disjunctive 
proposition that they are either green or square true. That work is done by each of the 
properties disjoined. 
The same is true for determinate forms of determinable properties, say the property of 
being red. All that is needed to make it true that something is red is an instance of one 
determinate shades of red that would figure in a disjunct of the putative disjunctive property 
of being either scarlet, or imperial red, or Indian red, or… Similarly all that is needed to make 
it true that something is either scarlet, or is imperial red, or is Indian red, or… is an instance 
of the determinate shade. The disjunctive property is completely redundant as a truth maker 
for either determinable propositions or disjunctive propositions. Once the redundancy of 
disjunctive properties is noted, there is absolutely no pressure to include disjunctive 
properties into our ontology, and for reasons that have nothing to do with similarity.  
 To summarise: we cannot conclude that rightness is a descriptive property from (N), 
and the necessary co-extension of the predicate ‘is right’ and the descriptive predicate D*,  
unless there is some descriptive way in which all right acts resemble each other. If there is no 
descriptive way in which they all resemble each other, then the property ascribed by the 
predicates ‘is right’ and D* cannot be a descriptive property. It could however be the 
(irreducible) property of being right, for the property of being right may well be the only way 
in which all right acts are similar, just as the only way in which all pleasant feelings might be 
similar is, as Sidgwick thought, in an evaluative way.  
Streumer’s second reduction argument. 
Streumer’s second argument for reduction is novel. He notes, as we have already seen, that if 
some simple first order normative theory were correct, then we would have a descriptive 
predicate that is necessarily coextensive with a normative predicate. In conjunction with (N) 
it would follow that: 
(1) If simple first-order normative views are correct, normative properties are 
identical to descriptive properties (32)   
Streumer also endorses   
(W) Whether normative properties are identical to descriptive properties cannot 
depend on which first-order normative view is correct. (31) 
In defence of (W) Streumer plausibly says that “…whether normative properties are identical 
to descriptive properties seems to depend on the nature of these properties rather than on” 
which objects have those properties, and which descriptive properties these objects have (31).  
If (1) and (W) are true, it must be true that “normative properties are identical to 
descriptive properties whether or not simple first-order normative views are correct” (32). 
Otherwise (1) would contradict (W). So the following must be true: 
 
(2) If some non-simple first-order normative view is correct, normative properties are 
identical with descriptive properties 
(1) and (2) together entail: 
(3) If any first-order normative view is correct, normative properties are identical with 
descriptive properties. 
 
This is an ingenious argument, but at least one of its premises, (W), can be challenged. I 
agree that there is something wrong about arguing from some first-order normative theory 
about what is right to some claim about the nature of rightness, although Scanlon maintained 
that the best way to think about debates about fundamental normative principles was as a 
debate about the nature of wrongness (1998, 11-12). But one need not start from the 
normative theory to get dependence. One might have an argument for the nature of rightness, 
which is such that if rightness has that nature then a certain normative theory must be true, or 
certain normative theories must be false. Moore seemed to argue in this way in Principia 
Ethica.  There he argued that rightness is the property of maximising intrinsic goodness. His 
argument runs as follows: 
1) Right acts are unique in respect of value.  
2) But no right action can possibly have unique value in the sense that it is the sole 
thing of value in the world. 
3) Its value cannot be unique in the sense that it has more intrinsic value than 
anything else in the world 
Therefore 
4) It can be unique only in the sense that it produces the best outcome.  
Therefore: 
5) The property an act has of being right is the property that act has of producing the 
best outcome. (PE, 197) 
This argument for a definition of rightness in terms of goodness does not start from any 
normative theory, but from what Moore takes to be a distinctive feature of the nature of 
rightness—its being unique in respect of value. But if Moore is right to define the property of 
being right as he does, then any first order normative theory that claims that an act can be 
right even though it does not produce the best outcome, such as a Kantian or Rossian theory, 
must be false. If the property of being right and the property of producing the best outcome 
are identical, it is not possible for some act to be right yet not produce the best outcome. So 
Moore’s account of the nature of rightness would depend upon which first order normative 
theory is true in the sense that, if some non-consequentialist theory were true, then rightness 
could not be as Moore argued it is. So an account of the nature of rightness could depend on 
whether a simple first order normative theory is true not because its nature is inferred from 
that theory, but because the theory follows from its nature. The same would be true if some 
naturalist theory of rightness were true. That might well constrain which normative theories 
could be true, and in that sense depend on whether they are true. 
I do not think Moore’s argument is very persuasive, and Moore himself quickly 
abandoned that definition of rightness, but that is beside the point. It is a perfectly legitimate 
way to argue, and it does make the nature of moral properties depend upon which first order 
normative theory is true. Moore’s view does not identify a moral property with a descriptive 
property, but defines it with reference to causality and intrinsic goodness. But it does show 
that the nature of some normative property can depend on which first order normative theory 
is true, and that casts doubt on (W).  
Another way one could legitimately argue from the nature of rightness to the truth of 
a simple first-order normative theory would be along the lines mentioned earlier from (N). 
One might argue that there is some descriptive way in which all right acts are similar. So 
there is a descriptive property that all right acts have, such that if an act has the property of 
being right it has this descriptive property, and vice versa. If all acts that have this descriptive 
property are also right, one will have a necessarily coextensive predicate. One might then 
argue using (N) that rightness is identical to that descriptive property. If that descriptive 
property is the property of maximising happiness, it would follow that the property of being 
right is identical with the property of maximising happiness. But if this is the nature of 
rightness it would imply that a simple form of utilitarianism must be true, and whether 
rightness is identical with this descriptive property would depend on the truth of a first-order 
normative theory and (W) would be false. Once again, it does not matter whether this is a 
compelling argument. All that matters is that this is a perfectly legitimate way to argue, 
which I think it is. 
In addition to the above concerns I do not think that Streumer’s argument for (W) sits 
comfortably with (N). According to (N) whether normative properties are identical with 
descriptive properties depends (supposedly) on whether we can construct a necessarily co-
extensive descriptive predicate. That doesn’t look like it has anything to do with the nature of 
these properties. (N) just tells us that two predicates always pick out the same property. It 
does not suppose that they do this because of the general nature of that property. Rather 
things are the other way round. That argument reaches a conclusion about the general nature 
of the property (its being descriptive in nature) because we can construct a predicate that 
necessarily co-refers. This presents Streumer with a dilemma.  
Either the argument for (W) is good or it is not.  
If it is a good argument, it will work against (N) so undermining the argument for (1). 
If it is not good, we can reject (W) and then there is no argument for (2).  
Either way Streumer’s second reduction argument fails. 
Conclusion 
Both Jackson’s and Streumer’s reduction argument fails because it fails to show that there is 
some descriptive way in which all right acts are similar. If there is no descriptive thread of 
similarity running through all right acts, then rightness could not be a descriptive property. 
And if the only way in which all right acts resemble each other is by being right, then that 
would have to be the single property ascribed by the predicate ‘is right’ and D*. These 
predicates would ascribe the single, non-descriptive property of being right. This conclusion 
sits perfectly with the second strand of Streumer’s argument that rightness, or any other 
normative property, is not identical with a descriptive property. So unlike Kant’s antinomy, 
Streumer’s antinomy ends up, I maintain, rejecting the thesis (reduction) and endorsing the 
antithesis (non-reduction). There is no argument from queerness in Streumer, so as far as that 
goes he has no reason not to accept this conclusion, which at least has the advantage of being 
credible, and so allowing him to believe his own view. 
Philip Stratton-Lake 
University of Reading 
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